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FACTS
This litigation arose out of the
claims of multiple, similarly situated
petitioners who own property used
as low-income rental housing and
financed by mortgage loans from
FmHA pursuant to Section 515 of
the National Housing Act of 1949,
Pub. L. no 87-723, § 4(b), 76 Stat.
671 (1962) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §1485 (1994)) ("National
Housing Act"). The facts most relevant to this case, however, do not
concern the actions of the petitioners themselves as much as they
revolve around acts of Congress
with regard to the evolution of this
loan program.

Editor's Note: The respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEWs deadline.
When the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in this case, it limited its
inquiry to questions concerning the
permissible statute of limitations for
contract claims and takings claims
arising when congressional legislation allegedly abridged the petitioners' rights to prepay mortgage loans
from the Farmer's Home
Administration of the United States
Department of Agriculture (FmHA).

The National Housing Act, as originally conceived, was designed to
foster development of public housing programs in rural areas. In
1962, the addition of Section 515 to
the National Housing Act (45 U.S.C.
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§ 1485) attempted to increase the
supply of available low-cost housing
by encouraging private parties to
begin developing low-income rental
housing.
Under the terms of Section 515, the
FmHA would lend money to private
parties through low-interest mortgage loans. In exchange for these
low-interest mortgages-and to further FmHA's primary goal of
increasing the availability of lowincome rural housing-the borrowers agreed to "regulatory covenants"
outlined in their loan agreements.
These covenants restricted the manner in which the subject property
could be used and also limited the
financial returns that the owner
could recoup from the property. The
heart of these restrictions included
the requirements that a borrower
receiving the benefit of these lowinterest loans "promised to accept
only eligible persons as tenants at
their properties, to charge rents no
higher than those permitted by
FmHA regulations, to restrict the
returns on their initial capital contributions, and to maintain certain
cash reserves." FranconiaAssoc. v.
United States, 240 F.3d 1358, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
The terms of these low-interest
mortgages lasted up to 50 years.
However, under the original loan
agreements between FmHA and the
borrowers, the loans could be prepaid at any time. This so-called
escape hatch freed a borrower of
the loan restrictions at any time
during the life of the mortgage as
soon as the mortgage was paid in
full. A borrower who chose to do
this could then convert the property
to a more commercially valuable
use either by renting it out at market rate or selling it for fair market
value unencumbered by the restrictions in effect during the life of the
loan.

The promissory notes signed by the
borrowers provided that such prepayments "may be made at any
time at the option of the borrower."
It was believed that this would be in
the best interests of all the parties
involved: the availability of the lowcost funds would encourage development of low-income housing as
desired by the government; the
unfettered availability of the prepayment option would help ameliorate the economic losses incurred
by borrowers; and the funds prepaid
to the government early in the life
of the loan would provide it with
additional cash to redirect to new
housing initiatives sooner than initially planned.
However, the prepayment option
seems to have become almost too
popular. Because property purchased with the FmHA loans
became more lucrative without the
restrictions on its use, many owners
opted to prepay. As a result, the
quantity of low-income Section 515
housing declined. Because this
undermined the goals of the
National Housing Act, Congress
responded to the problem with a
number of amendments. It is these
amendments-and their impact on
the contractual and property rights
of borrowers-that are at the heart
of this case.
First, in 1979, Congress passed the
Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-153, § 503, 93 Stat.
1134 (1979) (codified as amended
in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1472
(1982)) ("1979 legislation"). This
1979 legislation barred the FmHA
from allowing borrowers to prepay
their Section 515 mortgages unless
the owner consented to using the
property for low-income housing for
a minimum of 15 years from the
date of the loan. Although the
FmHA could waive this new requirement if it found that there was suffi-

cient low-income housing in the
area where the borrower's property
was located, the essential impact of
the 1979 legislation would have
been to end the widespread practice
of prepayment.
However, Congress provided that
this 1979 legislation would apply
retroactively to borrowers who had
contracted their FmHA mortgages
before 1979 as well as those who
took out loans after 1979. This
retroactivity feature sparked sharp
criticism of the 1979 legislation.
Thus, in 1980, the retroactive application of the 1979 legislation was
repealed by the Housing and
Community Development Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 514, 94
Stat. 1671 (1980) (codified as
amended in relevant part at 42
U.S.C. § 1472 (1994)) ("the 1980
legislation"). This 1980 legislation
continued to apply the restrictions
of the 1979 legislation to loan contracts entered into after the 1979
legislation. However, pre-1979 borrowers were no longer bound by
those restrictions that curtailed
their right to prepay.
For six years following the 1980 legislation, the FmHA resumed its
practice of accepting prepayments
from borrowers with pre-1979
loans. However, the need for lowincome housing remained great.
Thus, beginning October 18, 1986,
Congress began a series of moratoriums on accepting loan prepayments
for both pre- and post-1979 FmHA
mortgage loans. These moratoriums
were set to expire on March 15,
1988.
However, on February 5, 1988,
before the final moratorium expired,
Congress passed the Emergency
Low Income Housing Preservation
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-242, tit. II, 101
Stat. 1877 (1988), codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1472(c)
(Continued on Page 402)
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("ELIHPA"). This legislation, made
applicable to both pre- and post1979 borrowers, mandated that
before the FmHA can accept a prepayment from a borrower, it must
"make reasonable efforts to enter
into an agreement with the borrower under which the borrower, will
make a binding commitment to
extend the low-income use of
the assisted housing and related
facilities for not less than the 20year period beginning on the date
on which the agreement is executed." Id. at § 1472(c)(4)(A).
Furthermore, if no agreement is
reached during this "reasonable"
time, the FmHA must demand that
the owner then sell the property at
fair market value to a "qualified"
nonprofit organization or public
agency that promises to maintain
the property for low-income housing
use. Id. at § 1472(c)(5)(A)(i). It is
only after 180 days elapse with no
offer to purchase that the FmHA
may accept prepayment. Id. at §
1472(c)(5)(A)(ii).
There are two narrow exceptions to
this scheme. The first says that the
restrictions on prepayment will not
apply to those situations in which
prepayment will not adversely affect
the "housing opportunities of
minorities" and the prepaying borrower is "obligated to ensure that
tenants of [the property] will not be
displaced due to a change in the use
of the housing, or to an increase
in rental or other charges as a
result of the prepayment." Id. at
§ 1472(c)(5)(G)(ii)(I). This, in
effect, would require that a prepaying borrower retain all current lowincome tenants on the property
until they voluntarily moved.
The other exception is that the
restrictions on prepayment will not
apply when prepayment will not
adversely affect the "housing opportunities of minorities" and "there is
an adequate supply of safe, decent,

and affordable rental housing
within the market area" of the
borrower's property. Id. at §
1472(c)(5)(G)(ii)(II). Such a finding
of adequate low-cost options in the
area will allow prepayment and the
release of the borrower from the
restrictions of the loan.
As originally passed, ELIHPA was
dubbed an "emergency" act with a
two-year time limit. However, on
October 28, 1992, Congress enacted
the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-550, §§ 2, 712, 106 Stat.
3681, 3841 (1992) (codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1472(c)
(1992) ("the 1992 legislation"). This
legislation made the ELIHPA restrictions on pre-1979 borrowers permanent and applied them to post-1979
borrowers as well. In the wake of
the 1992 legislation, the FmHA then
issued implementing regulations
that detailed, among other things,
how the agency would evaluate
whether borrowers seeking prepayment would qualify for the exceptions to ELIHPA.
Petitioners are owners of lowincome housing who financed this
property with money borrowed
under the FmHA's Section 515
mortgage loan program prior to
1979. At the time they borrowed
the money, the petitioners were free
to prepay at a time of their own
choosing. Petitioners assert that
they would not have entered the
mortgage loan contracts "but for"
this option to prepay, since maintaining the property as low-income
housing for the life of the mortgage-a life sometimes lasting as
long as 50 years-would be fiscally
disadvantageous to them.
Following passage of ELIHPA, the
petitioners each decided to terminate their mortgage by exercising
the right to prepay as outlined in
their original loan agreement.
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However, as a result of ELIHPA's
tight restrictions on prepayment,
the written prepayment requests
made by some of the petitioners
were rejected by the FmHA on the
grounds that their properties were
located in areas that did not meet
the "adequate supply" of low-cost
housing requirement needed to get
an exception to the ELIHPA's stringent rules. Other petitioners did not
file formal written prepayment
requests to FmHA because they
allege that they were informed that
market conditions in their areas
would make such requests futile.
Facing the prospect of having their
property subject to the loan restrictions for the entire remaining life of
their mortgages, the petitioners filed
suit in the Court of Federal Claims.
Their complaint alleged, first, that
the 1992 legislation "anticipatorily
repudiated the contract between the
[government] and the [borrowers]"
and that this repudiation was also a
taking under the Fifth Amendment.
The petitioners sought monetary
damages to compensate them from
alleged financial losses that resulted
from their inability to prepay their
FmHA mortgage loans.
The Court of Federal Claims, however, granted the government's
motion to dismiss the borrowers'
claims on the ground that the
statute of limitations for bringing
those claims had run. Specifically,
28 U.S.C. § 2501 requires that
"fe]very claim of which the United
States Court of Federal Claims has
jurisdiction shall be barred unless
the petition thereon is filed within
six years after such claim first
accrues."
In FranconiaAssoc. v. United
States, 43 Fed.Cl. 702 (1999), the
court held that the cause of action
for the contract claim accrued in
1988 when ELIHPA was first passed.
Because the claims were brought
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more than six years after that time,
the court dismissed them. In so
doing, the court rejected the borrowers' arguments that the 1988
legislation was merely an anticipatory repudiation and that the 1992
legislation-rather than ELIHPA in
1988-was the relevant legislation.
The court reached a similar ruling
in Grass Valley Terrace v. United
States, 46 Fed.Ct. 629 (2000).
With regard to the Fifth
Amendment takings claim, the
Court of Federal Claims adopted a
similar line of reasoning, holding
that these claims were also timebarred because they accrued in
1988. Interestingly, the government
had not sought dismissal of these
property claims. However, the
FranconiaCourt dismissed them
sua sponte.
The borrowers then appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. In Franconia
Associates v. United States, 240
F.3d 1358 (2001), the court of
appeals grappled with the issues
that will face the Supreme Court. In
a February 15, 2001, opinion by
Judge Schall, the court affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of the petitioners' claims. (On May 17, 2001,
the court of appeals also affirmed
the lower court's decision in Grass
Valley, in a per curiam decision
with no opinion.)
The court of appeals relied on Hart
v. United States, 910 F.2d 815, 817
(Fed. Cir. 1998), for the proposition
that a claim against the United
States accrues "when all events
have occurred which fix the government's liability." Defining when "all"
of these events have occurred was
the task for the court of appeals and
remains the task for the Supreme
Court.
The court of appeals first rejected
the borrowers' argument that their

contract causes of action accrued
when the FmHA actually rejected
their request to prepay rather than
when the ELIHPA was passed.
Although the borrowers claimed
that ELIHPA was merely an anticipatory repudiation, the Court held
that because ELIHPA took away the
borrowers' previously "unfettered"
prepayment right, it was ELIHPA's
passage that breached the contract
and triggered the statute of limitations on the contract claim. The
court relied, in part, on its prior
opinion in Ariadne Fin. Serv. v.
United States, 133 F.3d 874, 879
(Fed. Cir. 1998), which stated that
"[t]he government's liability was
fixed when it refused to allow use of
the asset it promised."
The court also rejected the borrowers' alternative argument that it was
the 1992 legislation rather than the
1988 passage of ELIHPA that triggered the cause of action for the
contract claim. In doing so, the
court dismissed the claim that the
1988 statute was merely temporary
or interim. In the court's view, while
some provisions of the 1988 statute
may have been temporary, there "is
no ... language to indicate that the
restrictions on FmHA loan prepayments were anything but permanent
as to pre-1979 borrowers."
Once the court rejected the borrowers' contract claims, it used a similar analysis to deny their Fifth
Amendment takings claims. The
borrowers argued that the takings
claim was ripe only when an offer to
prepay was rejected or proven to be
futile. This would have required an
analysis of each petitioner's claim to
determine when the property interest was actually taken. However, the
court took the view that the "property" interest seized here was the
contract prepayment right. Because
the court ruled that the contract
right was breached with the 1988
passage of ELIHPA, it followed that

the property interest in these contract rights, if any, was seized at the
same time. Thus, the property
claims accrued at the same instant
as the contract claims-and more
than six years prior to the borrowers' suit.
Petitioners filed a Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, which was
rejected by the Federal Circuit on
June 12, 2001. Petitioners then petitioned for certiorari on September
10, 2001, and their petition was
granted on January 4, 2002.
CASE ANALYSIS
In resolving this dispute, the
Supreme Court will face the task of
defining when contract and property claims accrue against the government. Although this particular suit
involves the rights and obligations
of the parties to a specific form of
contract, the analysis of the Court
in this case will have a widespread
impact on broader questions,
including the status of the government as a contracting party and
questions regarding when legislation
can amount to a breach of contract
or a Fifth Amendment taking.
With regard to the contract claim,
the arguments that the Court will
hear will likely center on the question of whether the 1988 passage of
ELIHPA constituted an "anticipatory
repudiation" as the petitioners will
argue or a "breach" of contract as
held by the lower courts.
Petitioner's position is that the 1988
passage of ELIHPA amounts to an
anticipatory repudiation because it
was a statement of the government's
intent not to perform under the
terms of the original contract rather
than an actual refusal to do so.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 250 (1981) defines a repudiation
as a "statement by the obligor to the
obligee indicating that the obligor
(Continued on Page 404)
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will commit a breach that would of
itself give the obligee a claim of
damages for total breach." Relying
on this, petitioner argues that
ELIHPA was an anticipatory repudiation because that legislation, in
effect, merely announced that the
FmHA would no longer meet its
contractual obligations to allow prepayment except under limited circumstances not included in the
original contract. However, it was
not until the petitioners' requests to
prepay were denied or found futile
that the contractual obligations
were breached. In its arguments,
petitioner relies heavily on Mobil v.
United States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000),
which held "the Government's communication of its intent to commit
[a] breach amounted to a repudiation of the contracts." Id. at 621.
A finding that ELIHPA is an anticipatory repudiation rather than a
breach is an important distinction
for statute of limitation purposes.
An obligee under a contract for
which there is an anticipatory repudiation may bring a cause of action
at the time of the repudiation.
However, at the obligee's option, the
suit can also be delayed until the
time when performance should have
taken place but did not. Petitioners
will argue that they were within
their rights to wait until their claims
were rejected before bringing suit.
In their view, it was only when their
prepayment requests were refused
or deemed futile that their contracts
were breached and only then that
the six-year statute of limitations
began to run. If the Supreme Court
adopts petitioners' view that the
government's obligation under contracts was to accept prepayment,
then it would follow that there could
be no breach until the government
refused to accept a particular prepayment.
To support their position, the petitioners will refer to the exceptions

in the ELIHPA that allowed some
borrowers to prepay upon a finding
that there was sufficient low-income
housing in their area. Petitioners
will claim that this exception
requires some agency review before
they can know definitively that they
will not be able to prepay. Because
of this, they will argue that no
breach can occur until the agency
actually determines that they cannot take advantage of the exception
since, until that point, prepayment
remains theoretically possible.
Petitioners will argue that not until
and unless the government refuses
to accept a particular prepayment
has the agency actually taken action
in violation of the contracts.
In addition, petitioners will attempt
to persuade the Supreme Court that
adopting their arguments regarding
the repudiation/breach distinction is
required if contracts with the government are to be treated consistently with contracts between private parties. A different outcome,
they argue, will create a legal inconsistency that will undermine the
government's position as a contracting party.
In contrast, the government will
argue that the petitioners' contract
claim is rightfully a claim for breach
of contract rather than anticipatory
repudiation. In making this argument, the government will likely
advance the position taken by the
court of appeals. This view would
define the government's duty under
the contracts to be the obligation to
allow borrowers complete freedom
to prepay at any time of the borrowers' choosing rather than the obligation to accept these prepayments.
The original terms of the loan contracts did not require the government to make any decisions about
whether or not to accept prepayment; the choice to seek prepayment was entirely in the hands of
the borrower. Once ELIHPA was

passed in 1988, this changed. The
unilateral ability of the borrower to
decide when and if to seek prepayment was gone. Thus, it is in the
government's interest to argue that
taking away this unilateral freedom
and right to prepay is what, if anything, constituted the breach. If this
is so, it follows that the contract
was breached at the instant ELIHPA
was passed. Thus, it was at this
same time that the cause of action
for breach of that contract accrued.
In ruling for the government in the
opinion below, the court of appeals
held "[tihe government contracted
to allow borrowers the unfettered
right to prepay their loans and
breached that promise, if at all,
through the enactment of ELIHPA.
The statute of limitations began to
run at the time of the breach, when
ELIHPA was enacted on February 5,
1988." FranconiaAssociates, 240
F.3d at 1364. Thus, the government's contract case will likely center on convincing the Supreme
Court to take a similar view with
regard to determining how a breach
of contract should be defined.
With regard to the second question-the statute of limitations for
the Fifth Amendment takings
claim-the Supreme Court will
have to define precisely what property interest was taken from the
petitioners.
Petitioners will argue that there was
a regulatory taking of a distinct real
property interest. Specifically, they
will argue that ELIHPA was a regulatory taking because it restricted the
permissible use of their property.
Then, relying on Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2458
(2001); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l
PlanningAgency, 520 U.S. 725,
735-39 (1997); MacDoyle Sommer
& Frates v. County of Yolo, 410 U.S.
340, 348 (1986); Williamson
County Reg'l PlanningComm'n v.
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Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193
(1985); and Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980), petitioners
will argue that because the agency
was authorized to grant exemptions
to some affected owners, the regulatory taking was not ripe for judicial
review until either the agency made
a final decision about whether to
grant an exemption to each individual owner or it was determined that
applying for an exemption would
be futile. In the view of the petitioners, any other result would mean,
in effect, that a cause of action
accrued before it was ripe for judicial review.
In contrast, for the government to
convince the Supreme Court to
uphold the lower court's decision on
the takings issue, it must persuade
the Court that the petitioners' takings argument and contract argument are inextricably intertwined
because petitioners have no freestanding bases for their takings
claim. The government will argue
that once the contract claim fails,
so, too, should the alleged Fifth
Amendment claim.
The court of appeals ruled that the
alleged taking was not a seizing of a
real property interest at all but, if
anything, a seizing of the petitioners' contractual right to prepay
without the restrictions imposed by
ELIHPA. Relying on United States
Thust Co. of N.Y v. N.J., 431 U.S. 1,
19 n.16 (1977), and Greenbrierv.
United States, 193 F.3d 1348, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 1999), the court of
appeals ruled that "[c]ontract rights
are a form of property that may be
appropriated by the government."
FranconiaAssoc., 240 F.3d at 1365.
The government's case will be
strengthened if the Supreme Court
affirms this view and finds that the
property taking, if any, occurred
with the passage of ELIHPA since
this event "took away and conclusively abolished a material contract

right." Id. at 1366. If the Supreme
Court takes this view of the takings
claim, then its success or failure will
be completely tied to the success or
failure of the contract claim rather
than any independent analysis.
Hence, if the Supreme Court finds
that the contract claim fails, the
government will argue that the Fifth
Amendment claim must fail too.
Furthermore, even if the Supreme
Court finds that petitioners do have
a valid contract claim, the government is likely to argue that a takings
claim will still not arise because
contract remedies are sufficient to
compensate petitioners for any
alleged loss.
SIGNIFICANCE
At first blush, this case appears to
consider a narrow procedural issue
pertaining only to the jurisdiction of
the Court of Federal Claims and the
rules governing that court's statute
of limitations. However, there are
several more significant issues that
will be affected by the Supreme
Court's ruling in this case.
First, although this issue is not
directly before the Court, the ruling
in this case will have an effect on
the government's efforts to achieve
a greater supply of low-income
housing. If the Court rules for the
petitioners, there will be a financial
loss to the government as it either
makes amends for alleged damages
for breaching pre-1979 loan agreements or allows prepayments that it
would prefer not to. On the other
hand, if the Court rules for the government, it is possible that in the
future, would-be participants in similar loan programs may be deterred
from entering into those agreements
with the government. If future borrowers perceive that the terms to
which they agree are unstable or
subject to change too easily, they
may seek to invest their money in
other ways. The impact of either

outcome on the supply of lowincome housing may undermine the
initial goals of the Section 515 legislation. While it is not up to the
Supreme Court to address this
broader question-and, indeed, the
narrowly framed issues would make
it hard for it to do so-it is an issue
worth examining once the decision
is rendered.
More narrowly, the opinion will be
extraordinarily instructive as to the
status of congressional legislation as
a potential breach of contract or
Fifth Amendment taking. By definition, each time Congress enacts legislation, it changes the status quo.
The fact that this case is now being
heard by the Supreme Court illustrates that the law is still unclear as
to the legal impact of legislation that
changes the status quo with regard
to parties contracting with the federal government. Should a legislative change be considered a breach
of contract from the moment of
enactment? Should a legislative
change impact contract rights only
when regulations are issued to
implement that legislation? Should
a legislative change be considered
merely an anticipatory repudiation
that will not amount to a breach
unless an agency takes action pursuant to the new legislation? If the
latter, should legislation be drafted
in ways that will eliminate agency
discretion on the theory that this
will make it more likely that the legislation will be an outright breach
rather than an anticipatory repudiation of affected contracts? If so, is it
good public policy to provide legal
incentives for Congress to pass
absolute rules eliminating agency
discretion because this will start the
statute of limitation on claims sooner? While it is true that this particular case arose within the confines of
a particular complex loan program,
a well-reasoned and well-explained
opinion that explores the precise
(Continued on Page 406)
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legal effect of legislation on contractual claims will benefit both parties
contractingwith the government
and Congress itself.
This case is also significant in that it
provides the Court with a vehicle to
address the overlap between breach
of contract claims and Fifth
Amendment claims. While cases
have held that contractual rights
constitute property, there appears
to be ambiguity as to when these
two legally distinct claims should be
allowed to coexist when they arise
from the same set of facts. The
Court may take the position that
here the takings claim is completely
consumed under the contract claim.
Thus, if the contract claim fails, the
property claim fails and if the contract claim succeeds, the property
claim should still fail because the
contract remedies are sufficient to
compensate petitioners. A ruling of
this nature would significantly
undermine the notion that those in
petitioners' position have any recognizable or distinct property interest
in their contract rights. On the other hand, a finding that this set of
facts gives rise to both claims would
then raise complex questions as to
the difference between breach of
contract claims and Fifth
Amendment claims. At the very
least, this circumstance would
require the Court to explain what
makes these claims different from
each other and why aggrieved parties should be allowed to pursue
both. This cause may represent a
significant advance in the Supreme
Court's takings jurisprudenceregardless of whether it advances or
curtails the future scope of Fifth
Amendment claims.
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